Files
pic/api/firewall_manager.py
T
roof d5018c2b34 fix: architecture audit — security, atomicity, broken endpoints, test coverage
Sprint 1 — Security & correctness:
- Restore all 10 commented-out is_local_request() checks (vault, containers, images, volumes)
- Fix XFF spoofing: only trust the LAST X-Forwarded-For entry (Caddy's append), not all
- Require prefix length in wireguard.address (was accepting bare IPs like 10.0.0.1)
- Validate service_access list in add_peer (valid: calendar/files/mail/webdav)
- Fix dhcp/reservations POST/DELETE: unpack mac/ip/hostname from body (was passing dict as positional arg)
- Fix network/test POST: remove spurious data arg (test_connectivity takes no args)
- Fix remove_peer: clear iptables rules and regenerate DNS ACLs on deletion (was leaving stale rules)
- Fix CoreDNS reload: SIGHUP → SIGUSR1 (SIGHUP kills the process; SIGUSR1 triggers reload plugin)
- Remove local.{domain} block from Corefile template (local.zone doesn't exist, caused log spam)
- Fix routing_manager._remove_nat_rule: targeted -D instead of flushing entire POSTROUTING chain

Sprint 2 — State consistency:
- Atomic config writes in config_manager, ip_utils, firewall_manager, network_manager
  (write to .tmp → fsync → os.replace, prevents truncated files on kill)
- backup_config: now also backs up Caddyfile, Corefile, .env, DNS zone files
- restore_config: restores all of the above so config stays consistent after restore

Sprint 3 — Dead code / documentation:
- Remove CellManager instantiation from app startup (was never called, double-instantiated all managers)
- Document routing_manager scope (targets host, not cell-wireguard; methods not called by any active route)

Sprint 4 — Test infrastructure:
- Add tests/conftest.py with shared tmp_dir, tmp_config_dir, tmp_data_dir, flask_client fixtures
- Add tests/test_config_validation.py: 400 paths for ip_range, port, wireguard.address validation
- Add tests/test_ip_utils_caddyfile.py: 14 tests for write_caddyfile (was completely untested)
- Expand test_app_misc.py: 7 new is_local_request tests covering XFF spoofing and cell-network IPs
- Add --cov-fail-under=70 to make test-coverage
- Add pre-commit hook that runs pytest before every commit

414 tests pass (was 372).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-24 03:27:52 -04:00

318 lines
12 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Firewall Manager for Personal Internet Cell
Manages per-peer iptables rules in the WireGuard container and DNS ACLs in CoreDNS.
"""
import os
import subprocess
import logging
import re
from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Virtual IPs assigned to Caddy per service — must match Caddyfile listeners.
# Populated at import time from the default subnet; call update_service_ips()
# whenever ip_range changes so all downstream callers see the new values.
SERVICE_IPS: Dict[str, str] = {
'calendar': '172.20.0.21',
'files': '172.20.0.22',
'mail': '172.20.0.23',
'webdav': '172.20.0.24',
}
def update_service_ips(ip_range: str) -> None:
"""Recalculate SERVICE_IPS from the new subnet and update in-place."""
from ip_utils import get_virtual_ips
new_ips = get_virtual_ips(ip_range)
SERVICE_IPS.clear()
SERVICE_IPS.update(new_ips)
# Internal RFC-1918 ranges (peer traffic stays inside these = cell-only access)
PRIVATE_NETS = ['10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16']
WIREGUARD_CONTAINER = 'cell-wireguard'
CADDY_CONTAINER = 'cell-caddy'
COREFILE_PATH = '/app/config/dns/Corefile'
ZONE_DATA_DIR = '/data' # inside CoreDNS container; mounted from ./data/dns
def _run(cmd: List[str], check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
"""Run a shell command and return the result."""
try:
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)
if check and result.returncode != 0:
logger.warning(f"Command {cmd} exited {result.returncode}: {result.stderr.strip()}")
return result
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Command {cmd} failed: {e}")
raise
def _wg_exec(args: List[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
"""Run a command inside the WireGuard container via docker exec."""
return _run(['docker', 'exec', WIREGUARD_CONTAINER] + args, check=False)
def _caddy_exec(args: List[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
"""Run a command inside the Caddy container via docker exec."""
return _run(['docker', 'exec', CADDY_CONTAINER] + args, check=False)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Virtual IP management (Caddy container)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def ensure_caddy_virtual_ips() -> bool:
"""Add per-service virtual IPs to Caddy's eth0 if not already present."""
try:
result = _caddy_exec(['ip', 'addr', 'show', 'eth0'])
existing = result.stdout
for service, ip in SERVICE_IPS.items():
if ip not in existing:
r = _caddy_exec(['ip', 'addr', 'add', f'{ip}/16', 'dev', 'eth0'])
if r.returncode == 0:
logger.info(f"Added virtual IP {ip} for {service} to Caddy eth0")
else:
logger.warning(f"Failed to add virtual IP {ip}: {r.stderr.strip()}")
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"ensure_caddy_virtual_ips failed: {e}")
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# iptables rule helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _iptables(args: List[str], check: bool = False) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
return _wg_exec(['iptables'] + args)
def _rule_exists(chain: str, rule_args: List[str]) -> bool:
result = _iptables(['-C', chain] + rule_args)
return result.returncode == 0
def _ensure_rule(chain: str, rule_args: List[str]) -> None:
"""Insert rule at top of chain if it doesn't already exist."""
if not _rule_exists(chain, rule_args):
_iptables(['-I', chain] + rule_args)
def _delete_rule(chain: str, rule_args: List[str]) -> None:
"""Delete rule from chain (silently if it doesn't exist)."""
while _rule_exists(chain, rule_args):
_iptables(['-D', chain] + rule_args)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Per-peer rule management
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _peer_comment(peer_ip: str) -> str:
return f'pic-peer-{peer_ip.replace(".", "-")}'
def clear_peer_rules(peer_ip: str) -> None:
"""Remove all FORWARD rules tagged with this peer's IP via iptables-save/restore."""
comment = _peer_comment(peer_ip)
try:
# Dump rules, strip matching lines, restore — atomic and order-stable
save = _wg_exec(['iptables-save'])
if save.returncode != 0:
return
lines = save.stdout.splitlines()
filtered = [l for l in lines if comment not in l]
if len(filtered) == len(lines):
return # nothing to remove
restore_input = '\n'.join(filtered) + '\n'
restore = subprocess.run(
['docker', 'exec', '-i', WIREGUARD_CONTAINER, 'iptables-restore'],
input=restore_input, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10
)
if restore.returncode != 0:
logger.warning(f"iptables-restore failed: {restore.stderr.strip()}")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"clear_peer_rules({peer_ip}): {e}")
def apply_peer_rules(peer_ip: str, settings: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""
Apply iptables FORWARD rules for a peer based on their access settings.
Each rule is inserted at position 1 (-I), so the LAST call ends up at the TOP.
We insert in reverse-priority order: lowest-priority rules first, highest last.
Desired final chain order (top = highest priority):
1. Per-service DROP/ACCEPT (most specific — must beat private-net ACCEPT)
2. Peer-to-peer ACCEPT/DROP (10.0.0.0/24)
3. Private-net ACCEPTs (for no-internet peers to reach local resources)
4. Internet DROP or ACCEPT (lowest priority catch-all)
"""
try:
comment = _peer_comment(peer_ip)
clear_peer_rules(peer_ip)
internet_access = settings.get('internet_access', True)
service_access = settings.get('service_access', list(SERVICE_IPS.keys()))
peer_access = settings.get('peer_access', True)
# --- Step 1 (inserted first → ends up at bottom before default ACCEPT) ---
# Internet catch-all: allow or block
if internet_access:
_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip,
'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', 'ACCEPT'])
else:
# Block non-private, allow private nets
_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip,
'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', 'DROP'])
for net in reversed(PRIVATE_NETS):
_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip, '-d', net,
'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', 'ACCEPT'])
# --- Step 2 --- Peer-to-peer (10.0.0.0/24)
target = 'ACCEPT' if peer_access else 'DROP'
_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip, '-d', '10.0.0.0/24',
'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', target])
# --- Step 3 (inserted last → ends up at TOP of chain) ---
# Per-service rules — inserted in reverse dict order so first service ends up at top
for service, svc_ip in reversed(list(SERVICE_IPS.items())):
target = 'ACCEPT' if service in service_access else 'DROP'
_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip, '-d', svc_ip,
'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', target])
logger.info(f"Applied rules for {peer_ip}: internet={internet_access} "
f"services={service_access} peers={peer_access}")
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"apply_peer_rules({peer_ip}): {e}")
return False
def apply_all_peer_rules(peers: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
"""Re-apply rules for all peers (called on startup)."""
ensure_caddy_virtual_ips()
for peer in peers:
ip = peer.get('ip')
if not ip:
continue
apply_peer_rules(ip, {
'internet_access': peer.get('internet_access', True),
'service_access': peer.get('service_access', list(SERVICE_IPS.keys())),
'peer_access': peer.get('peer_access', True),
})
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DNS ACL (CoreDNS Corefile generation)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Service subdomains that get per-peer ACL rules in the CoreDNS zone block
_ACL_SERVICES = ('calendar', 'files', 'mail', 'webdav')
def _build_acl_block(blocked_peers_by_service: Dict[str, List[str]],
domain: str = 'cell') -> str:
"""
Build CoreDNS ACL plugin stanzas.
blocked_peers_by_service: { 'calendar': ['10.0.0.2', '10.0.0.3'], ... }
Returns a string to embed in the primary zone block.
"""
if not blocked_peers_by_service:
return ''
lines = []
for service in _ACL_SERVICES:
peer_ips = blocked_peers_by_service.get(service, [])
if not peer_ips:
continue
host = f'{service}.{domain}.'
for ip in peer_ips:
lines.append(f' acl {host} {{')
lines.append(f' block net {ip}/32')
lines.append(f' allow net 0.0.0.0/0')
lines.append(f' allow net ::/0')
lines.append(f' }}')
return '\n'.join(lines)
def generate_corefile(peers: List[Dict[str, Any]], corefile_path: str = COREFILE_PATH,
domain: str = 'cell') -> bool:
"""
Rewrite the CoreDNS Corefile with per-peer ACL rules and reload plugin.
The file is written to corefile_path (API-side path mapped into CoreDNS container).
domain: the configured cell domain (e.g. 'cell', 'dev') — must match zone file names.
"""
try:
# Collect which peers block which services
blocked: Dict[str, List[str]] = {s: [] for s in SERVICE_IPS}
for peer in peers:
ip = peer.get('ip')
if not ip:
continue
allowed_services = peer.get('service_access', list(SERVICE_IPS.keys()))
for service in SERVICE_IPS:
if service not in allowed_services:
blocked[service].append(ip)
acl_block = _build_acl_block(blocked, domain)
primary_zone_block = f'{domain} {{\n file /data/{domain}.zone\n log\n'
if acl_block:
primary_zone_block += acl_block + '\n'
primary_zone_block += '}\n'
corefile = f""". {{
forward . 8.8.8.8 1.1.1.1
cache
log
health
}}
{primary_zone_block}
"""
# local.{domain} block intentionally omitted: /data/local.zone does not exist
# and CoreDNS logs errors on every reload for a missing zone file.
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(corefile_path), exist_ok=True)
tmp_path = corefile_path + '.tmp'
with open(tmp_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(corefile)
f.flush()
os.fsync(f.fileno())
os.replace(tmp_path, corefile_path)
logger.info(f"Wrote Corefile to {corefile_path}")
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"generate_corefile: {e}")
return False
def reload_coredns() -> bool:
"""Signal CoreDNS to reload its config. SIGUSR1 triggers the reload plugin; SIGHUP kills the process."""
try:
result = _run(['docker', 'kill', '--signal=SIGUSR1', 'cell-dns'], check=False)
if result.returncode == 0:
logger.info("Sent SIGUSR1 to cell-dns (reload)")
return True
logger.warning(f"SIGUSR1 to cell-dns failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
return False
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"reload_coredns: {e}")
return False
def apply_all_dns_rules(peers: List[Dict[str, Any]], corefile_path: str = COREFILE_PATH,
domain: str = 'cell') -> bool:
"""Regenerate Corefile and reload CoreDNS."""
ok = generate_corefile(peers, corefile_path, domain)
if ok:
reload_coredns()
return ok