a43f9fbf0d
P0 — Broken functionality: - Fix 12+ endpoints with wrong manager method signatures (email/calendar/file/routing) - Fix email_manager.delete_email_user() missing domain arg - Fix cell-link DNS forwarding wiped on every peer change (generate_corefile now accepts cell_links param; add/remove_cell_dns_forward no longer clobber the file) - Fix Flask SECRET_KEY regenerating on every restart (persisted to DATA_DIR) - Fix _next_peer_ip exhaustion returning 500 instead of 409 - Fix ConfigManager Caddyfile path (/app/config-caddy/) - Fix UI double-add and wrong-key peer bugs in Peers.jsx / WireGuard.jsx - Remove hardcoded credentials from Dashboard.jsx P1 — Security: - CSRF token validation on all POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH to /api/* (double-submit pattern) - enforce_auth: 503 only when users file readable but empty; never bypass on IOError - WireGuard add_cell_peer: validate pubkey, name, endpoint against strict regexes - DNS add_cell_dns_forward: validate IP and domain; reject injection chars - DNS zone write: realpath containment + record content validation - iptables comment /32 suffix prevents substring match deleting wrong peer rules - is_local_request() trusts only loopback + 172.16.0.0/12 (Docker bridge) - POST /api/containers: volume allow-list prevents arbitrary host mounts - file_manager: bcrypt ($2b→$2y) for WebDAV; realpath containment in delete_user - email/calendar: stop persisting plaintext passwords in user records - routing_manager: validate IPs, networks, and interface names - peer_registry: write peers.json at mode 0o600 - vault_manager: Fernet key file at mode 0o600 - CORS: lock down to explicit origin list - domain/cell_name validation: reject newline, brace, semicolon injection chars P2 — Architecture: - Peer add: rollback registry entry if firewall rules fail post-add - restart_service(): base class now calls _restart_container(); email and calendar managers call cell-mail / cell-radicale respectively - email/calendar managers sync user list (no passwords) to cell_config.json - Pending-restart flag cleared only after helper subprocess exits with code 0 - docker-compose.yml: add config-caddy volume to API container P3 — Tests (854 → 1020): - Fill test_email_endpoints.py, test_calendar_endpoints.py, test_network_endpoints.py, test_routing_endpoints.py - New: test_peer_management_update.py, test_peer_management_edge_cases.py, test_input_validation.py, test_enforce_auth_configured.py, test_cell_link_dns.py, test_logs_endpoints.py, test_cells_endpoints.py, test_is_local_request_per_endpoint.py, test_caddy_routing.py - E2E conftest: skip WireGuard suite when wg-quick absent - Update existing tests to match fixed signatures and comment formats Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
353 lines
14 KiB
Python
353 lines
14 KiB
Python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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Firewall Manager for Personal Internet Cell
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Manages per-peer iptables rules in the WireGuard container and DNS ACLs in CoreDNS.
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"""
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import os
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import subprocess
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import logging
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import re
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from typing import Dict, List, Any, Optional
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Virtual IPs assigned to Caddy per service — must match Caddyfile listeners.
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# Populated at import time from the default subnet; call update_service_ips()
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# whenever ip_range changes so all downstream callers see the new values.
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SERVICE_IPS: Dict[str, str] = {
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'calendar': '172.20.0.21',
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'files': '172.20.0.22',
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'mail': '172.20.0.23',
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'webdav': '172.20.0.24',
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}
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def update_service_ips(ip_range: str) -> None:
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"""Recalculate SERVICE_IPS from the new subnet and update in-place."""
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from ip_utils import get_virtual_ips
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new_ips = get_virtual_ips(ip_range)
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SERVICE_IPS.clear()
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SERVICE_IPS.update(new_ips)
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# Internal RFC-1918 ranges (peer traffic stays inside these = cell-only access)
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PRIVATE_NETS = ['10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16']
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WIREGUARD_CONTAINER = 'cell-wireguard'
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CADDY_CONTAINER = 'cell-caddy'
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COREFILE_PATH = '/app/config/dns/Corefile'
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ZONE_DATA_DIR = '/data' # inside CoreDNS container; mounted from ./data/dns
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def _run(cmd: List[str], check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
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"""Run a shell command and return the result."""
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try:
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result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)
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if check and result.returncode != 0:
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logger.warning(f"Command {cmd} exited {result.returncode}: {result.stderr.strip()}")
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return result
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Command {cmd} failed: {e}")
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raise
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def _wg_exec(args: List[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
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"""Run a command inside the WireGuard container via docker exec."""
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return _run(['docker', 'exec', WIREGUARD_CONTAINER] + args, check=False)
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def _caddy_exec(args: List[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
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"""Run a command inside the Caddy container via docker exec."""
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return _run(['docker', 'exec', CADDY_CONTAINER] + args, check=False)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Virtual IP management (Caddy container)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def ensure_caddy_virtual_ips() -> bool:
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"""Add per-service virtual IPs to Caddy's eth0 if not already present."""
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try:
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result = _caddy_exec(['ip', 'addr', 'show', 'eth0'])
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existing = result.stdout
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for service, ip in SERVICE_IPS.items():
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if ip not in existing:
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r = _caddy_exec(['ip', 'addr', 'add', f'{ip}/16', 'dev', 'eth0'])
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if r.returncode == 0:
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logger.info(f"Added virtual IP {ip} for {service} to Caddy eth0")
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else:
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logger.warning(f"Failed to add virtual IP {ip}: {r.stderr.strip()}")
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return True
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"ensure_caddy_virtual_ips failed: {e}")
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return False
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# iptables rule helpers
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _iptables(args: List[str], check: bool = False) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
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return _wg_exec(['iptables'] + args)
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def _rule_exists(chain: str, rule_args: List[str]) -> bool:
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result = _iptables(['-C', chain] + rule_args)
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return result.returncode == 0
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def _ensure_rule(chain: str, rule_args: List[str]) -> None:
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"""Insert rule at top of chain if it doesn't already exist."""
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if not _rule_exists(chain, rule_args):
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_iptables(['-I', chain] + rule_args)
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def _delete_rule(chain: str, rule_args: List[str]) -> None:
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"""Delete rule from chain (silently if it doesn't exist)."""
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while _rule_exists(chain, rule_args):
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_iptables(['-D', chain] + rule_args)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Per-peer rule management
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _peer_comment(peer_ip: str) -> str:
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# SECURITY: append a non-numeric, non-dash suffix so peer comments cannot
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# be substrings of one another. Without this, the comment for 10.0.0.1
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# ('pic-peer-10-0-0-1') is a prefix of 10.0.0.10..19 and a naive
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# substring match would delete unrelated peers' rules.
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return f'pic-peer-{peer_ip.replace(".", "-")}/32'
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def clear_peer_rules(peer_ip: str) -> None:
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"""Remove all FORWARD rules tagged with this peer's IP via iptables-save/restore."""
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comment = _peer_comment(peer_ip)
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# SECURITY: match the comment as a complete --comment token, not a
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# substring. iptables-save renders comments as `--comment "<value>"` (or
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# occasionally without quotes), so we anchor on the surrounding quotes /
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# whitespace. Even with the unique /32 suffix in _peer_comment, we keep
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# exact-token matching so a future change to the comment format cannot
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# silently re-introduce the substring-deletion bug.
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comment_re = re.compile(
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rf'--comment\s+["\']?{re.escape(comment)}["\']?(\s|$)'
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)
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try:
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# Dump rules, strip matching lines, restore — atomic and order-stable
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save = _wg_exec(['iptables-save'])
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if save.returncode != 0:
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return
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lines = save.stdout.splitlines()
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filtered = [l for l in lines if not comment_re.search(l)]
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if len(filtered) == len(lines):
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return # nothing to remove
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restore_input = '\n'.join(filtered) + '\n'
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restore = subprocess.run(
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['docker', 'exec', '-i', WIREGUARD_CONTAINER, 'iptables-restore'],
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input=restore_input, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10
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)
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if restore.returncode != 0:
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logger.warning(f"iptables-restore failed: {restore.stderr.strip()}")
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"clear_peer_rules({peer_ip}): {e}")
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def apply_peer_rules(peer_ip: str, settings: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
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"""
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Apply iptables FORWARD rules for a peer based on their access settings.
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Each rule is inserted at position 1 (-I), so the LAST call ends up at the TOP.
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We insert in reverse-priority order: lowest-priority rules first, highest last.
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Desired final chain order (top = highest priority):
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1. Per-service DROP/ACCEPT (most specific — must beat private-net ACCEPT)
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2. Peer-to-peer ACCEPT/DROP (10.0.0.0/24)
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3. Private-net ACCEPTs (for no-internet peers to reach local resources)
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4. Internet DROP or ACCEPT (lowest priority catch-all)
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"""
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try:
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comment = _peer_comment(peer_ip)
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clear_peer_rules(peer_ip)
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internet_access = settings.get('internet_access', True)
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service_access = settings.get('service_access', list(SERVICE_IPS.keys()))
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peer_access = settings.get('peer_access', True)
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# --- Step 1 (inserted first → ends up at bottom before default ACCEPT) ---
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# Internet catch-all: allow or block
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if internet_access:
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_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip,
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'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', 'ACCEPT'])
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else:
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# Block non-private, allow private nets
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_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip,
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'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', 'DROP'])
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for net in reversed(PRIVATE_NETS):
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_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip, '-d', net,
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'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', 'ACCEPT'])
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# --- Step 2 --- Peer-to-peer (10.0.0.0/24)
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target = 'ACCEPT' if peer_access else 'DROP'
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_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip, '-d', '10.0.0.0/24',
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'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', target])
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# --- Step 3 (inserted last → ends up at TOP of chain) ---
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# Per-service rules — inserted in reverse dict order so first service ends up at top
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for service, svc_ip in reversed(list(SERVICE_IPS.items())):
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target = 'ACCEPT' if service in service_access else 'DROP'
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_iptables(['-I', 'FORWARD', '-s', peer_ip, '-d', svc_ip,
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'-m', 'comment', '--comment', comment, '-j', target])
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logger.info(f"Applied rules for {peer_ip}: internet={internet_access} "
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f"services={service_access} peers={peer_access}")
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return True
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"apply_peer_rules({peer_ip}): {e}")
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return False
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def apply_all_peer_rules(peers: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
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"""Re-apply rules for all peers (called on startup)."""
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ensure_caddy_virtual_ips()
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for peer in peers:
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ip = peer.get('ip')
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if not ip:
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continue
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apply_peer_rules(ip, {
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'internet_access': peer.get('internet_access', True),
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'service_access': peer.get('service_access', list(SERVICE_IPS.keys())),
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'peer_access': peer.get('peer_access', True),
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})
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# DNS ACL (CoreDNS Corefile generation)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Service subdomains that get per-peer ACL rules in the CoreDNS zone block
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_ACL_SERVICES = ('calendar', 'files', 'mail', 'webdav')
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def _build_acl_block(blocked_peers_by_service: Dict[str, List[str]],
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domain: str = 'cell') -> str:
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"""
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Build CoreDNS ACL plugin stanzas.
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blocked_peers_by_service: { 'calendar': ['10.0.0.2', '10.0.0.3'], ... }
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Returns a string to embed in the primary zone block.
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"""
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if not blocked_peers_by_service:
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return ''
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lines = []
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for service in _ACL_SERVICES:
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peer_ips = blocked_peers_by_service.get(service, [])
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if not peer_ips:
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continue
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host = f'{service}.{domain}.'
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for ip in peer_ips:
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lines.append(f' acl {host} {{')
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lines.append(f' block net {ip}/32')
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lines.append(f' allow net 0.0.0.0/0')
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lines.append(f' allow net ::/0')
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lines.append(f' }}')
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return '\n'.join(lines)
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def generate_corefile(peers: List[Dict[str, Any]], corefile_path: str = COREFILE_PATH,
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domain: str = 'cell',
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cell_links: Optional[List[Dict[str, Any]]] = None) -> bool:
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"""
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Rewrite the CoreDNS Corefile with per-peer ACL rules and reload plugin.
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The file is written to corefile_path (API-side path mapped into CoreDNS container).
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domain: the configured cell domain (e.g. 'cell', 'dev') — must match zone file names.
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cell_links: optional list of cell-to-cell DNS forwarding entries, each a dict with
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'domain' and 'dns_ip' keys (same shape as CellLinkManager.list_connections()).
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When non-empty, a forwarding stanza is appended for each entry.
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"""
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try:
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# Collect which peers block which services
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blocked: Dict[str, List[str]] = {s: [] for s in SERVICE_IPS}
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for peer in peers:
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ip = peer.get('ip')
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if not ip:
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continue
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allowed_services = peer.get('service_access', list(SERVICE_IPS.keys()))
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for service in SERVICE_IPS:
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if service not in allowed_services:
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blocked[service].append(ip)
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acl_block = _build_acl_block(blocked, domain)
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primary_zone_block = f'{domain} {{\n file /data/{domain}.zone\n log\n'
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if acl_block:
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primary_zone_block += acl_block + '\n'
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primary_zone_block += '}\n'
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corefile = f""". {{
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forward . 8.8.8.8 1.1.1.1
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cache
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log
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health
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}}
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{primary_zone_block}"""
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# Append cell-to-cell DNS forwarding stanzas if provided
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if cell_links:
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for link in cell_links:
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link_domain = link.get('domain', '')
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link_dns_ip = link.get('dns_ip', '')
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if not link_domain or not link_dns_ip:
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continue
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corefile += (
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f'\n{link_domain} {{\n'
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f' forward . {link_dns_ip}\n'
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f' cache\n'
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f' log\n'
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f'}}\n'
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)
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else:
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corefile += '\n'
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# local.{domain} block intentionally omitted: /data/local.zone does not exist
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# and CoreDNS logs errors on every reload for a missing zone file.
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os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(corefile_path), exist_ok=True)
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tmp_path = corefile_path + '.tmp'
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with open(tmp_path, 'w') as f:
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f.write(corefile)
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f.flush()
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os.fsync(f.fileno())
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os.replace(tmp_path, corefile_path)
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logger.info(f"Wrote Corefile to {corefile_path}")
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return True
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"generate_corefile: {e}")
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return False
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def reload_coredns() -> bool:
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"""Signal CoreDNS to reload its config. SIGUSR1 triggers the reload plugin; SIGHUP kills the process."""
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try:
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result = _run(['docker', 'kill', '--signal=SIGUSR1', 'cell-dns'], check=False)
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if result.returncode == 0:
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logger.info("Sent SIGUSR1 to cell-dns (reload)")
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return True
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logger.warning(f"SIGUSR1 to cell-dns failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
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return False
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"reload_coredns: {e}")
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return False
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def apply_all_dns_rules(peers: List[Dict[str, Any]], corefile_path: str = COREFILE_PATH,
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domain: str = 'cell',
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cell_links: Optional[List[Dict[str, Any]]] = None) -> bool:
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"""Regenerate Corefile (including any cell-to-cell forwarding stanzas) and reload CoreDNS."""
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ok = generate_corefile(peers, corefile_path, domain, cell_links)
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if ok:
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reload_coredns()
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return ok
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