Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
roof 0b103ffafb feat(cells): fix PIC-to-PIC connection + add service-sharing permissions
Phase 1 — connection fixes:
- routing_manager.stop(): remove iptables -F / -t nat -F nuclear flush that
  would wipe WireGuard MASQUERADE and all peer rules on any UI stop action
- wireguard_manager.add_cell_peer(): reject vpn_subnet that overlaps the local
  WG network (routing blackhole — was the root cause of no handshake)
- wireguard_manager._syncconf(): pass Endpoint to 'wg set' so cell peers with
  static endpoints are synced to the kernel (not just AllowedIPs)

Phase 2 — service-sharing permissions backend:
- firewall_manager: add _cell_tag(), clear_cell_rules(), apply_cell_rules(),
  apply_all_cell_rules() — iptables FORWARD rules for cell-to-cell traffic
  using 'pic-cell-<name>' comment tags, distinct from 'pic-peer-*'
- app.py startup enforcement: call apply_all_cell_rules(cell_links) so rules
  survive API restarts
- cell_link_manager: permissions schema {inbound, outbound} per service;
  lazy migration for existing entries; update_permissions(), get_permissions();
  apply_cell_rules wired into add_connection/remove_connection
- routes/cells.py: GET /api/cells/services, GET+PUT /api/cells/<n>/permissions;
  RuntimeError now returns 400 (not 500) from add_connection

Removed broken 'test' cell (subnet 10.0.0.0/24 collided with local WG network).
Second PIC must use a distinct subnet (e.g. 10.0.1.0/24) before reconnecting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 08:35:24 -04:00
roof a43f9fbf0d fix: full security audit remediation — P0/P1/P2/P3 fixes + 1020 passing tests
P0 — Broken functionality:
- Fix 12+ endpoints with wrong manager method signatures (email/calendar/file/routing)
- Fix email_manager.delete_email_user() missing domain arg
- Fix cell-link DNS forwarding wiped on every peer change (generate_corefile now
  accepts cell_links param; add/remove_cell_dns_forward no longer clobber the file)
- Fix Flask SECRET_KEY regenerating on every restart (persisted to DATA_DIR)
- Fix _next_peer_ip exhaustion returning 500 instead of 409
- Fix ConfigManager Caddyfile path (/app/config-caddy/)
- Fix UI double-add and wrong-key peer bugs in Peers.jsx / WireGuard.jsx
- Remove hardcoded credentials from Dashboard.jsx

P1 — Security:
- CSRF token validation on all POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH to /api/* (double-submit pattern)
- enforce_auth: 503 only when users file readable but empty; never bypass on IOError
- WireGuard add_cell_peer: validate pubkey, name, endpoint against strict regexes
- DNS add_cell_dns_forward: validate IP and domain; reject injection chars
- DNS zone write: realpath containment + record content validation
- iptables comment /32 suffix prevents substring match deleting wrong peer rules
- is_local_request() trusts only loopback + 172.16.0.0/12 (Docker bridge)
- POST /api/containers: volume allow-list prevents arbitrary host mounts
- file_manager: bcrypt ($2b→$2y) for WebDAV; realpath containment in delete_user
- email/calendar: stop persisting plaintext passwords in user records
- routing_manager: validate IPs, networks, and interface names
- peer_registry: write peers.json at mode 0o600
- vault_manager: Fernet key file at mode 0o600
- CORS: lock down to explicit origin list
- domain/cell_name validation: reject newline, brace, semicolon injection chars

P2 — Architecture:
- Peer add: rollback registry entry if firewall rules fail post-add
- restart_service(): base class now calls _restart_container(); email and calendar
  managers call cell-mail / cell-radicale respectively
- email/calendar managers sync user list (no passwords) to cell_config.json
- Pending-restart flag cleared only after helper subprocess exits with code 0
- docker-compose.yml: add config-caddy volume to API container

P3 — Tests (854 → 1020):
- Fill test_email_endpoints.py, test_calendar_endpoints.py,
  test_network_endpoints.py, test_routing_endpoints.py
- New: test_peer_management_update.py, test_peer_management_edge_cases.py,
  test_input_validation.py, test_enforce_auth_configured.py,
  test_cell_link_dns.py, test_logs_endpoints.py, test_cells_endpoints.py,
  test_is_local_request_per_endpoint.py, test_caddy_routing.py
- E2E conftest: skip WireGuard suite when wg-quick absent
- Update existing tests to match fixed signatures and comment formats

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-27 11:30:21 -04:00
roof d5018c2b34 fix: architecture audit — security, atomicity, broken endpoints, test coverage
Sprint 1 — Security & correctness:
- Restore all 10 commented-out is_local_request() checks (vault, containers, images, volumes)
- Fix XFF spoofing: only trust the LAST X-Forwarded-For entry (Caddy's append), not all
- Require prefix length in wireguard.address (was accepting bare IPs like 10.0.0.1)
- Validate service_access list in add_peer (valid: calendar/files/mail/webdav)
- Fix dhcp/reservations POST/DELETE: unpack mac/ip/hostname from body (was passing dict as positional arg)
- Fix network/test POST: remove spurious data arg (test_connectivity takes no args)
- Fix remove_peer: clear iptables rules and regenerate DNS ACLs on deletion (was leaving stale rules)
- Fix CoreDNS reload: SIGHUP → SIGUSR1 (SIGHUP kills the process; SIGUSR1 triggers reload plugin)
- Remove local.{domain} block from Corefile template (local.zone doesn't exist, caused log spam)
- Fix routing_manager._remove_nat_rule: targeted -D instead of flushing entire POSTROUTING chain

Sprint 2 — State consistency:
- Atomic config writes in config_manager, ip_utils, firewall_manager, network_manager
  (write to .tmp → fsync → os.replace, prevents truncated files on kill)
- backup_config: now also backs up Caddyfile, Corefile, .env, DNS zone files
- restore_config: restores all of the above so config stays consistent after restore

Sprint 3 — Dead code / documentation:
- Remove CellManager instantiation from app startup (was never called, double-instantiated all managers)
- Document routing_manager scope (targets host, not cell-wireguard; methods not called by any active route)

Sprint 4 — Test infrastructure:
- Add tests/conftest.py with shared tmp_dir, tmp_config_dir, tmp_data_dir, flask_client fixtures
- Add tests/test_config_validation.py: 400 paths for ip_range, port, wireguard.address validation
- Add tests/test_ip_utils_caddyfile.py: 14 tests for write_caddyfile (was completely untested)
- Expand test_app_misc.py: 7 new is_local_request tests covering XFF spoofing and cell-network IPs
- Add --cov-fail-under=70 to make test-coverage
- Add pre-commit hook that runs pytest before every commit

414 tests pass (was 372).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-24 03:27:52 -04:00
roof 50671f71cb fix: use configured domain in CoreDNS Corefile generation
Two bugs caused DNS to fail when the domain name changes:
1. generate_corefile() hardcoded 'cell' as the zone name instead of
   using the configured domain — on startup it would silently reset any
   domain change back to 'cell'
2. apply_domain() regex replaced ALL non-dot zones (including local.cell)
   with the new domain → duplicate zone blocks → CoreDNS crash

Fix: add a domain parameter to generate_corefile/apply_all_dns_rules,
add _configured_domain() helper in app.py, and delegate Corefile updates
in apply_domain() to generate_corefile() so the logic is in one place.
Also parameterise SERVICE_HOSTS ACL entries via the domain argument.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 15:32:23 -04:00
roof 615448b875 feat: dynamic ip_range propagation to DNS, firewall, and docker-compose
When ip_range changes in Settings, the new subnet is now applied to:
- DNS zone records (network_manager.apply_ip_range)
- Caddy virtual IPs (firewall_manager.ensure_caddy_virtual_ips)
- iptables per-service rules (firewall_manager.update_service_ips)
- docker-compose.yml static IPs if writable (ip_utils.update_docker_compose_ips)

New module ip_utils.py derives all container IPs from the subnet using
fixed offsets so the entire stack stays consistent from one setting.

321 tests pass (72 new tests added for ip_utils, apply_ip_range, update_service_ips).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 10:26:21 -04:00
roof 53c7661812 feat: per-peer access enforcement, live peer status, auto IP assignment
Server-side access control:
- firewall_manager.py: per-peer iptables FORWARD rules in WireGuard container;
  virtual IPs on Caddy (172.20.0.21-24) for per-service DROP/ACCEPT targeting
- CoreDNS Corefile regenerated with ACL blocks for blocked services per peer
- POST /api/wireguard/apply-enforcement re-applies rules after WireGuard restart;
  wg0.conf PostUp calls it via curl so rules restore automatically on container start

WireGuard fixes:
- _syncconf uses `wg set peer` instead of `wg syncconf` to avoid resetting ListenPort
- add_peer validates AllowedIPs must be /32 — rejects full/split tunnel CIDRs that
  would route internet or LAN traffic to that peer
- _config_file() checks for linuxserver wg_confs/ subdirectory first

UI:
- Peers page fetches /api/wireguard/peers/statuses for live handshake data;
  status badge now shows real Online/Offline + seconds since last handshake
- IP field removed from Add Peer form (auto-assigned from 10.0.0.0/24)

Tests (246 pass):
- test_firewall_manager.py: 22 tests for ACL generation, iptables rule correctness,
  comment tagging, clear_peer_rules filter logic
- test_peer_wg_integration.py: 10 tests for /32 enforcement, IP auto-assignment,
  syncconf called on add/remove
- test_wireguard_manager.py: updated to reflect correct IPs and /32 requirement

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-21 01:01:07 -04:00