- PicNgoDDNS.update(): send token in request body instead of Authorization
header; DDNS server validates it from body (was returning HTTP 422 on
every heartbeat, leaving IP record stale after fresh install)
- peers.py / Peers.jsx: webdav service_access only valid when 'files' store
service is installed; was always shown even with no services, confusing
users into thinking WebDAV was pre-installed
- 10 new regression tests: DDNS update body contract, Caddy always
regenerates on startup with no services, peer role allowed on
/api/services/active, webdav gating by installed services
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- add_peer() now calls account_manager.provision() for any installed store
service whose manifest declares accounts.manager == 'http', enabling
per-peer credential provisioning to third-party HTTP services
- reapply_on_startup() calls egress_manager.apply_all() so fwmark rules
survive container restarts without manual intervention
- add GET /api/egress/status and PUT /api/egress/services/<id>/exit routes
so the UI can read and override per-service egress policy
- tests: HTTP provision wiring (happy path + non-fatal failure), egress
apply_all at startup (wired/unwired/failure cases)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two manifest validation bugs blocked all store service installs:
1. service_store_manager.RESERVED_SUBDOMAINS included 'mail', which
prevented the email service from using its required subdomain.
Removed mail/calendar/files/webmail — they belong to official PIC
store services and must be claimable by them.
2. manifest_validator required @sha256 digest pins on ALL images,
including first-party git.pic.ngo/roof/* images that the PIC team
builds and controls. service_store_manager._validate_manifest already
only warned for first-party images; the secondary validator was
stricter than intended, causing a hard reject on :latest tags.
Aligned to warn-not-reject for first-party; malformed digests (when
provided) are still a hard error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ServiceStoreManager.install() now delegates container lifecycle to
ServiceComposer (per-service docker-compose.yml) instead of appending to a
shared compose override. This eliminates IP pool allocation, compose override
rendering, and the single-stack docker exec approach.
Changes:
- service_composer.py: add _resolve_requires(), _resolve_dependents(),
reapply_active_services() — dependency graph and startup reapply
- service_store_manager.py: rewrite install() and remove() to use
ServiceComposer; add _fetch_template(); delete _allocate_service_ip(),
_render_compose_override(), _write_compose_override(); remove() now guards
against removing services that others depend on
- managers.py: pass service_composer= to ServiceStoreManager
- Tests: 13 new composer dep tests; TestInstall/TestRemove rewritten for
the new composer-driven path; test_optional_services_feature.py updated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduces api/manifest_validator.py as a single security chokepoint
imported by both ServiceComposer and ServiceStoreManager:
- validate_manifest(): rejects kind=builtin, reserved container names,
reserved subdomains, backend denylist (localhost, cell-api, etc.),
cap_add outside allowlist / in denylist, shell-string provision hooks,
and env values with shell-special characters
- validate_rendered_compose(): walks the rendered YAML and rejects
privileged:true, host network/pid/ipc/userns, absolute bind mounts,
denied capabilities, devices key, apparmor/seccomp unconfined, and
string-form command/entrypoint (shell-injection vector)
- validate_provision_hook(): requires argv list form, lowercase binary,
rejects NUL bytes
ServiceStoreManager changes:
- _validate_manifest() delegates to validate_manifest() after existing checks
- _fetch_manifest() and fetch_index() now stream with a 256 KB size cap
(prevents memory exhaustion from a malicious or compromised index)
- Digest-pin warning for images missing @sha256 (hard error for unknown
registries, warning for git.pic.ngo/roof/* and TRUSTED_IMAGES_NO_DIGEST)
ServiceComposer changes:
- write_compose() calls validate_rendered_compose() before any disk write
so no partial file is left if validation fails
- render_template() substitutes ${PIC_DATA_DIR} with the resolved data_dir path
102 new tests in tests/test_manifest_validator.py covering all five P0
security issues. Existing test mocks updated to use streaming response
pattern (stream=True + raw.read) and valid compose YAML templates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
roof