37d023659a51583d105777de1b4bb70a980e3a9c
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 roof
|
a43f9fbf0d |
fix: full security audit remediation — P0/P1/P2/P3 fixes + 1020 passing tests
P0 — Broken functionality: - Fix 12+ endpoints with wrong manager method signatures (email/calendar/file/routing) - Fix email_manager.delete_email_user() missing domain arg - Fix cell-link DNS forwarding wiped on every peer change (generate_corefile now accepts cell_links param; add/remove_cell_dns_forward no longer clobber the file) - Fix Flask SECRET_KEY regenerating on every restart (persisted to DATA_DIR) - Fix _next_peer_ip exhaustion returning 500 instead of 409 - Fix ConfigManager Caddyfile path (/app/config-caddy/) - Fix UI double-add and wrong-key peer bugs in Peers.jsx / WireGuard.jsx - Remove hardcoded credentials from Dashboard.jsx P1 — Security: - CSRF token validation on all POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH to /api/* (double-submit pattern) - enforce_auth: 503 only when users file readable but empty; never bypass on IOError - WireGuard add_cell_peer: validate pubkey, name, endpoint against strict regexes - DNS add_cell_dns_forward: validate IP and domain; reject injection chars - DNS zone write: realpath containment + record content validation - iptables comment /32 suffix prevents substring match deleting wrong peer rules - is_local_request() trusts only loopback + 172.16.0.0/12 (Docker bridge) - POST /api/containers: volume allow-list prevents arbitrary host mounts - file_manager: bcrypt ($2b→$2y) for WebDAV; realpath containment in delete_user - email/calendar: stop persisting plaintext passwords in user records - routing_manager: validate IPs, networks, and interface names - peer_registry: write peers.json at mode 0o600 - vault_manager: Fernet key file at mode 0o600 - CORS: lock down to explicit origin list - domain/cell_name validation: reject newline, brace, semicolon injection chars P2 — Architecture: - Peer add: rollback registry entry if firewall rules fail post-add - restart_service(): base class now calls _restart_container(); email and calendar managers call cell-mail / cell-radicale respectively - email/calendar managers sync user list (no passwords) to cell_config.json - Pending-restart flag cleared only after helper subprocess exits with code 0 - docker-compose.yml: add config-caddy volume to API container P3 — Tests (854 → 1020): - Fill test_email_endpoints.py, test_calendar_endpoints.py, test_network_endpoints.py, test_routing_endpoints.py - New: test_peer_management_update.py, test_peer_management_edge_cases.py, test_input_validation.py, test_enforce_auth_configured.py, test_cell_link_dns.py, test_logs_endpoints.py, test_cells_endpoints.py, test_is_local_request_per_endpoint.py, test_caddy_routing.py - E2E conftest: skip WireGuard suite when wg-quick absent - Update existing tests to match fixed signatures and comment formats Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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roof
|
8650704316 |
feat: add authentication and authorization system
Backend: - AuthManager (api/auth_manager.py): server-side user store with bcrypt password hashing, account lockout after 5 failed attempts (15 min), and atomic file writes - AuthRoutes (api/auth_routes.py): Blueprint at /api/auth/* — login, logout, me, change-password, admin reset-password, list-users - app.py: register auth_bp blueprint; add enforce_auth before_request hook (401 for unauthenticated, 403 for wrong role; only active when auth store has users so pre-auth tests remain green); instantiate AuthManager; update POST /api/peers to require password >= 10 chars and auto-provision email + calendar + files + auth accounts with full rollback on any failure; extend DELETE /api/peers to tear down all four service accounts; add /api/peer/dashboard and /api/peer/services peer-scoped routes; fix is_local_request to also trust the last X-Forwarded-For entry appended by the reverse proxy (Caddy) - Role-based access: admin for /api/* (except /api/auth/* which is public and /api/peer/* which is peer-only) - setup_cell.py: generate and print initial admin password, store in .admin_initial_password with 0600 permissions; cleaned up on first admin login Frontend: - AuthContext.jsx: React context with login/logout/me state and Axios interceptor for automatic 401 redirect - PrivateRoute.jsx: route guard component - Login.jsx: login page with error handling and must-change-password redirect - AccountSettings.jsx: change-password form for any authenticated user - PeerDashboard.jsx: peer-role landing page (IP, service list) - MyServices.jsx: peer service links page - App.jsx, Sidebar.jsx: AuthContext integration, logout button, PrivateRoute wrappers, peer-role routing - Peers.jsx, WireGuard.jsx, api.js: auth-aware API calls Tests: 100 new auth tests all pass (test_auth_manager, test_auth_routes, test_route_protection, test_peer_provisioning). Fix pre-existing test failures: update WireGuard test keys to valid 44-char base64 format (test_wireguard_manager, test_peer_wg_integration), add password field and service manager mocks to test_api_endpoints peer tests, add auth helpers to conftest.py. Full suite: 845 passed, 0 failures. Fixed: .admin_initial_password security cleanup on bootstrap, username minimum length (3 chars enforced by USERNAME_RE regex) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |