Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
roof 7d5c5421f1 Implement connectivity store services (wireguard-ext, openvpn-client, tor)
Unit Tests / test (push) Successful in 11m31s
- ConnectivityManager: move config dirs to data_dir/services/<id>/config so
  Docker can bind-mount them into store-service containers (Docker resolves
  bind-mount paths on the host, not inside the API container).  Add
  _migrate_legacy_configs to copy existing files from the old config_dir
  location on first boot.

- manifest_validator: add allow_host_network parameter to
  validate_rendered_compose.  When True, waives the external-network
  requirement, permits network_mode: host, and allows devices: — all needed
  by VPN/Tor containers that must share the host network namespace to create
  tun/wg interfaces.  Non-host services are unaffected.

- service_composer: read requires_host_network from the manifest and pass
  allow_host_network=True to validate_rendered_compose for connectivity
  services.

- Tests: update file-path assertions to new data_dir layout; add
  TestMigrateLegacyConfigs, TestValidateRenderedComposeHostNetwork, and
  two TestWriteCompose cases for the host-network path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 10:06:48 -04:00
roof f7bb2cc962 fix: allow first-party store service subdomains and registry images
Unit Tests / test (push) Successful in 11m25s
Two manifest validation bugs blocked all store service installs:

1. service_store_manager.RESERVED_SUBDOMAINS included 'mail', which
   prevented the email service from using its required subdomain.
   Removed mail/calendar/files/webmail — they belong to official PIC
   store services and must be claimable by them.

2. manifest_validator required @sha256 digest pins on ALL images,
   including first-party git.pic.ngo/roof/* images that the PIC team
   builds and controls. service_store_manager._validate_manifest already
   only warned for first-party images; the secondary validator was
   stricter than intended, causing a hard reject on :latest tags.
   Aligned to warn-not-reject for first-party; malformed digests (when
   provided) are still a hard error.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 03:09:41 -04:00
roof 1f2f9d9f6e feat: add manifest_validator.py — security chokepoint for compose and manifest validation
Unit Tests / test (push) Successful in 11m18s
Rejects privileged compose configs (network_mode:host, pid:host, ipc:host,
userns_mode:host, cap_add:ALL, string commands, missing cell-network,
reserved container names). Validates manifest schema_version=3, image
digest pinning (sha256 required, :tag-only rejected), and provision hook
format. Wired into ServiceComposer.write_compose() and
ServiceStoreManager.install() as a single enforcement point.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 18:45:45 -04:00
roof 18b50d08c1 fix: post-Phase-0 corrections — data-dir bind mounts, reserved subdomains, list_active()
Unit Tests / test (push) Successful in 11m31s
Three related fixes discovered during review of Phase 0 and Phase 1 manifests:

1. validate_rendered_compose(): add allowed_data_dir param. After ${PIC_DATA_DIR}
   substitution, compose templates produce absolute paths; without this the
   validator would reject every service install.  ServiceComposer.write_compose()
   now passes its resolved data_dir so only the designated data directory is
   exempt — /etc, /proc, docker.sock etc. still blocked.

2. _RESERVED_SUBDOMAINS: remove service-level subdomains (mail, calendar, files,
   webdav, webmail). The reserved list should protect PIC infrastructure endpoints
   (api, webui, admin) — not service subdomains that official store services
   (calendar, files, webmail) must be allowed to claim.  Aligns with the
   existing _RESERVED_SUBS in service_registry.py.

3. ServiceRegistry.list_active(): new method returning only installed store
   services (no builtins). This is the forward-looking API that Phase 2 will
   make the primary read path once builtins are deleted. Adding it now unblocks
   the QA agent's test_optional_services_feature.py which was already testing
   the expected Phase 2 behaviour.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 07:35:43 -04:00
roof c40919d374 feat: Phase 0 — manifest_validator, compose YAML safety check, cap_add allowlist, backend denylist, provision hook enforcement, size cap
Introduces api/manifest_validator.py as a single security chokepoint
imported by both ServiceComposer and ServiceStoreManager:

- validate_manifest(): rejects kind=builtin, reserved container names,
  reserved subdomains, backend denylist (localhost, cell-api, etc.),
  cap_add outside allowlist / in denylist, shell-string provision hooks,
  and env values with shell-special characters
- validate_rendered_compose(): walks the rendered YAML and rejects
  privileged:true, host network/pid/ipc/userns, absolute bind mounts,
  denied capabilities, devices key, apparmor/seccomp unconfined, and
  string-form command/entrypoint (shell-injection vector)
- validate_provision_hook(): requires argv list form, lowercase binary,
  rejects NUL bytes

ServiceStoreManager changes:
- _validate_manifest() delegates to validate_manifest() after existing checks
- _fetch_manifest() and fetch_index() now stream with a 256 KB size cap
  (prevents memory exhaustion from a malicious or compromised index)
- Digest-pin warning for images missing @sha256 (hard error for unknown
  registries, warning for git.pic.ngo/roof/* and TRUSTED_IMAGES_NO_DIGEST)

ServiceComposer changes:
- write_compose() calls validate_rendered_compose() before any disk write
  so no partial file is left if validation fails
- render_template() substitutes ${PIC_DATA_DIR} with the resolved data_dir path

102 new tests in tests/test_manifest_validator.py covering all five P0
security issues.  Existing test mocks updated to use streaming response
pattern (stream=True + raw.read) and valid compose YAML templates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 07:23:08 -04:00